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Corporatised enforcement: Challenges of regulating AirBnB and other platform economies 
 
Platforms such as AirBnB, Uber, Taskrabbit etc are proliferating across the globe. Their success 
and popularity has been based on positioning themselves as companies that offer flexibility to 
freelance workers and asset owners and enable them to make ‘a bit of money on the side’. For 
their consumers, it is about enhanced and authentic customer experience of ´sharing´, at a lower 
cost. While this rhetoric of ‘sharing’ is, at first glance, flexible, inclusive and empowering, on 
closer examination it presents myriad contradictions and controversies as soon as the platforms 
begin interacting with existing practices and governance infrastructures. As Tom Slee (2016) 
amongst others have pointed out, digital platform companies such as AirBnB and Uber openly 
disrupt and often disregard local laws governing labor, housing, health, safety, accessibility and 
so forth in order to safeguard their for-profit operations. A key manifestation of this is their 
reluctance to share data on their platform-mediated economic activities and cooperate with local 
authorities who need it in order to enforce local laws and policies, citing confidentiality and 
privacy amongst other reasons. In our study of short-term letting in London, for instance, we 
noted that local authorities struggled to gain access to corporate data to assess the extent of the 
phenomenon, the percentage of entire homes, as well as the overall length, which was necessary 
to enforce the 90-day limit on short term lets (Ferreri and Sanyal, 2018; Holman et al., 2018). In 
addition, platforms have also been slow to respond to criticisms around discrimination (Edelman, 
Luca & Svirsky, 2017), sexual assault
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 and other preventable issues. In other words, they have 
for a long time reaped the benefits of connecting people to goods and services whilst absolving 
themselves of responsibility to manage problems when they arise, and preventing access to 
legislators.  
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One could argue that part of what drives the success of platform economies is their arrival in a 
time of austerity and economic recession in many parts of the world. In many countries in 
Europe, such as the United Kingdom, Greece and Spain, public spending has been slashed in the 
wake of economic crises and local governments struggle to provide public services to their 
citizens. This includes access to affordable housing, affordable public transportation and other 
public services. The empowering rhetoric of platform economies of ‘sharing’ and earning ‘a bit 
of money on the side’ hides a more insidious practice of undermining labor protection including 
minimum wage, pensions, leave and so forth by recasting workers as independent contractors
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. 
With AirBnB, the problems are manifold. In addition to violating local laws that disallow or 
limit short term lets (Ferreri and Sanyal, 2018; Holman et al., 2018), hosts on AirBnB have been 
converting properties into short lets, putting pressure on already limited housing supply and 
increasing rental values.  Whilst the platform claims that owners are ‘sharing’ their homes with 
guests, in reality, it has been shown that a considerable number of ‘hosts’ are letting out entire 
homes and even buying additional properties to put on AirBnB, and are thus not earning extra 
cash on the side, but rather, finding a convenient way to circumvent local regulations and costs 
around hotels and hospitality. This is because property owners and agencies have discovered that 
they can generate greater revenue by putting their properties on short term letting than by long 
term leases. As a result, in many cases, such as in London (and Barcelona), local authorities have 
found that at the neighbourhood level these platforms are directly linked to a diminishing supply 
of affordable housing for poorer families. Many of these issues have led to increasing 
gentrification in many cities such as Barcelona, and growing disenchantment and protests by 
local residents. 
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For planners, digital platforms offer a number of different challenges- from affecting the 
provision of public goods, to creating enforcement challenges for local authorities at a time when 
budgets are being slashed, to attempting to rewrite local regulations. How can local governments 
maintain planning powers over the provision of long-term adequate affordable housing with 
shrinking financial means, and shrinking availability of units as well? How can they meet their 
statutory obligations in the face of opposition, often from national governments who undermine 
their efforts in an attempt to woo these platforms (Ferreri and Sanyal, 2018; Holman et al., 
2018)? Perhaps an exploration of the politics of platform economies would expose rifts between 
different scales of governance and the rights and obligations embedded within them? There is 
also the question of enforcing local regulations: city governments are at the mercy of 
corporations to release their data and on devising creative ways to enforce regulations despite 
shrinking budgets. In London for example, local governments have to rely on complaints by 
local residents and triangulate these with Google earth images and information from the AirBnB 
website itself in order to track down particular properties to fine them. This is not feasible for 
local governments with limited finances and staff. And while some governments may embrace 
platform economies as a convenient and cutting-edge and a sign of a techno-utopian future, to 
what extent are these platforms and their emancipatory rhetoric serving as a smokescreen to 
enable the state to withdraw further?  
As digitally-mediated economies are on the rise in cities across the globe, the situation has 
enabled the growing influence of digital platform companies on practices of urban regulation 
design and enforcement. New forms of “hybrid or cooperative regulation whereby government 
and online firms negotiate around rules and their implementation” (Gurran 2018, p.301) are 
being proposed as a solution, introducing a significant shift for planning practice. While 
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proposals for hybridity, cooperation and negotiation are appealing, there remain unanswered 
questions about the power relations at play and the implications for city governments that may 
not have the resources or political clout to respond to a corporation, feeding into unprecedented 
dependency on IT firms for dealing with urban issues (Kitchin, 2014). As planners, we have to 
ask more difficult political questions about the technological, corporatized turn in planning that 
is being brought on by platform economies.  The de-politicisation of digital platforms and their 
implication for urban planning and policy has been going hand in hand with declining public 
budgets. In this context, dependency on corporate digital providers for solutions is often driven 
by a “desire to make do with the meagre amount of resources available to most cities today” 
(Morozov & Bria, 2018, p.19). How could planners work towards a more inclusive model that 
includes those that are not benefitting from or are adversely affected by the sharing economy? 
Rather than retreating into technophobia, calls have been made for asserting ‘technological 
sovereignty’, which has been defined as “citizens’ capacity to have a say and participate in how 
the technological infrastructure around them operates and what ends it serves” (Morozov & Bria, 
2018, p.22). Working towards technological sovereignty at the urban scale, for instance, would 
involve municipal governments demanding different ownership regimes of data generated by 
digital platforms, which would help in assessing the extent of platform-mediated uses and 
designing enforcement without the need for buying such data from corporate partners. 
The possibility for non-extractive uses of digital platform technologies (see also Gurran, 2018) is 
not, however, just a matter of regaining sovereignty over data. ‘Data extractivism’ relies on the 
corporatisation of a wider digital infrastructure, including knowledge and know-how, which city 
governments are unlikely to have or to be able to build on their own. Even if cities were capable 
to obtain the data collected by for profit digital platforms, they may find themselves “unable to 
 5 
act upon the data without advanced computing infrastructure or access to the original 
algorithms” (Morozov and Bria, 2018, p.23). Planning policy tackling the multiple issues raised 
by digital platform economies thus requires a much more holistic approach to rethinking and 
reclaiming the wider urban digital infrastructure. From some of the cities most affected by the 
rise of digital-mediated short term letting, such as Barcelona, calls have been made to think 
about a ‘right to the digital city’ as a fundamental component of a wider ´right to the city’ for the 
21
st
 Century.  Appeals to citizens, however, have already been rapidly incorporated in the 
marketing strategy of platform companies such as Airbnb, whose website ‘airbnbcitizen’ collects 
news items on positive community impact and public policy collaborations tailored to cities in 26 
countries around the globe (see https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/). More work remains to be done 
to both decouple citizens from consumers, and city planning from corporate solutions – if we are 
to extricate urban policies from the demand of for-profit platform economy giants. 
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